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Abstract
Integrating actions and state constraints is a central problem in knowledge representation. State
constraints are commonly used to represent the relationship between objects in the world. When a
representation of action is integrated, state constraints implicitly define indirect effects of actions and
impose further preconditions on the performance of actions. Thus, a semantically correct integration
of actions and state constraints must address the ramification and qualification problems, as well as
the frame problem. In this paper we achieve such an integration for a syntactically restricted class of
situation calculus theories.
This paper presents two major technical contributions. The first contribution is an axiomatic
closed-form solution to the frame, ramification and qualification problems for a common class
of theories. The solution is presented in the form of an automatable procedure that compiles a
syntactically restricted set of situation calculus ramification constraints and effect axioms into a set
of successor state axioms. The second major contribution of this paper is an independent semantic
justification for this closed-form solution. In particular, we present a semantic specification for
a solution to the frame and ramification problems in terms of a prioritized minimization policy,
and show that the successor state axioms of our closed-form solution adhere to this specification.
Observing that our minimization policy is simply an instance of prioritized circumscription, we
exploit results of Lifschitz (1985) on computing circumscription to show that computing the
prioritized circumscription yields our successor state axioms. In the special case where there are
no ramification constraints, computing the circumscription yields Reiter’s (1991) earlier successor
state axiom solution to the frame problem. Ó 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
This paper presents an axiomatic closed-form solution to the frame, ramification and
qualification problems for a commonly occurring class of state constraints. The results
in this paper are motivated by and contribute towards addressing the following general
problem.
Given a set of state constraints describing some aspect of the world which we
henceforth refer to as the system, how do we integrate a representation of action,
so that we can reason about the effects of an agent’s 2 actions on the system, and the
effect of the system on the agent’s ability to perform those actions.
This general problem arises in the context of many applications of artificial intelligence
(AI). For example, in the case of diagnostic problem solving, we might have a set of state
constraints representing the behaviour of some device, such as a power plant or a motor
vehicle. We might then wish to integrate a representation of action in order to perform such
tasks as monitoring, system maintenance, intrusive testing, repair, contingency planning or
supervisory control. In an e-commerce application, we might have a set of state constraints
representing the ontology of companies’ products, their compatibility, their component
parts, the suppliers of those parts, and the current inventory. We might wish to integrate
a representation of the actions of various agent programs that interact automatically with
the system to, for example, configure a system from component parts, or to buy or sell
products. Finally, in an active vision application, the state constraints might represent the
properties of and relationships between objects that could occur in a scene, and we might
wish to integrate a representation of actions in order to contemplate the effects of moving
the camera or acting upon objects in the scene in support of image understanding.
Integrating actions and state constraints presents several knowledge representation
challenges. In the context of a representation of action, state constraints play two roles.
On the one hand, they capture the relationship between objects in the world, and hence
the consistent states of a system. In this role, state constraints have traditionally been used
to reason about system state; for example, in the case of diagnostic problem solving, to
conjecture diagnoses. When integrated with a representation of action, state constraints
play an additional role. They serve as ramification constraints and qualification constraints,
implicitly defining indirect effects of actions, and further constraining when actions can be
performed, respectively. Consequently, in addressing the general problem of integrating
actions and state constraints, we must preserve the original role of our state constraints
while providing a solution to the frame, ramification and qualification problems.
The frame, ramification and qualification problems are three classical problems that arise
in reasoning about action using formal logic [6]. Put simply, the frame problem, first posed
by McCarthy and Hayes [22], is the problem of characterizing what does not change when
an action is performed. The ramification problem, so named by Finger [5], is the problem
of characterizing the indirect effects of actions; a problem that can arise when a theory of
action is integrated with a set of state constraints. Finally, the qualification problem, also
2 We consider an agent to be a human, a computer program, a robot, or nature.
S.A. McIlraith / Artificial Intelligence 116 (2000) 87–121 89
attributed to McCarthy [20], is the problem of characterizing the preconditions for actions;
a problem that is aggravated by the existence of state constraints. Shanahan outlined
three criteria for evaluating proposed solutions to the frame problem [40]. These criteria
apply equally well to the ramification and qualification problems. Most fundamental is
the criterion of representational parsimony, which requires that the representation of the
solution be compact. Second is the criterion of expressive flexibility, which requires that the
solution be sufficiently robust to deal with complex domain features, e.g., nondeterminism
or concurrency. Finally the solution should be elaboration tolerant [21], that is, intuitively,
the representation should be easily amenable to the addition of new information. A number
of researchers have examined the frame, ramification and qualification problems over the
years (e.g. [4,6,14,34,39,40,42], to name but a few); however a general solution has proven
elusive.
In this paper, we address the general problem of integrating a representation of action
with an existing set of state constraints by exploiting the language of the situation
calculus and integrating a situation calculus representation of action with a set of first-
order logic state constraints. This paper presents two major technical contributions to this
end. First, for an arguably common class of state constraints, we provide an axiomatic
closed-form solution to the frame and ramification problems. Our closed-form solution
is captured by a parsimonious set of first-order logic axioms, that compose part of the
domain axiomatization. We contrast this to solutions requiring nonmonotonic reasoning
or a non-classical consequence relation. A closed-form solution such as ours is appealing
for time-critical applications, as well as for tasks such as diagnosis, where solving the
frame and ramification problems is not an end in itself. Our solution is presented via an
automatable procedure that compiles a set of situation calculus ramification constraints
and effect axioms into a set of successor state axioms. A shortcoming in the justification
of our closed-form solution is that it relies on an informal appeal to a completeness
assumption and a causal interpretation of the material implication connective. To overcome
these shortcoming, the second major contribution of this paper is to provide independent
semantic justification for our solution.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we overview the specific situation
calculus language we employ. In Section 3 we describe our starting point, a domain
axiomatization that includes both state constraints and a situation calculus representation
of action, but that does not address the frame, ramification or qualification problems.
This is illustrated with respect to a simplified power plant feedwater system, which we
refer to throughout the paper. In Section 4 we examine the ramification problem in more
detail, showing that a previous solution to the frame and ramification problems in our
language is not sufficiently discriminating to capture the intended interpretation of our
domain axiomatization, and outlining our intuitions for a solution. In Section 4.2 we
describe our proposal for a closed-form solution to the frame and ramification problems
for a class of syntactically restricted state constraints, which we contend occur commonly
in applications of AI. The solution comprises a simple syntactic manipulation which
compiles ramification constraints and effect axioms into a set of successor state axioms,
under a completeness assumption and a causal interpretation of the material implication
connective. These successor state axioms capture the intended interpretation of our theory.
To complete the solution to our problem, Section 5 outlines a solution to the qualification
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problem which appeals to existing results [15], compiling our qualification constraints,
necessary conditions for action and successor state axioms into action precondition axioms.
Section 6 discusses some advantages and disadvantages of our approach.
In Section 7 we provide important independent semantic justification for the solution
to the frame and ramification problems, presented in the first half of the paper.
We first define a prioritized minimization policy following the intuition exploited by
our closed-form solution. Appealing to this minimization policy we provide semantic
specification for a solution to the frame and ramification problems. Further we show
that under a consistency assumption, our successor state axioms are indeed a solution
with respect to this specification. Observing that our minimization policy is simply an
instance of prioritized circumscription, we exploit results by Lifschitz on computing
circumscription [12] to show that computing the prioritized circumscription yields our
successor state axioms. Finally, we show that when there are no ramifications, computing
the circumscription results in the set of successor state axioms Reiter proposed as a solution
to the frame problem [33]. This provides further justification for his solution to the frame
problem. The paper concludes with a discussion of related work and a summary of our
contributions.
2. The situation calculus
The situation calculus was first proposed by John McCarthy in the early 1960s as a
logical representation scheme for reasoning about action and change [19]. The situation
calculus language we employ to represent our domains is a sorted first-order language
with equality. The language consists of sorts actions, situations, and domain. Each action
is represented as a (parameterized) first-class object within the language. The evolution
of the world can be viewed as a tree rooted at the distinguished initial situation S0. The
branches of the tree are determined by the possible future situations that could arise from
the realization of particular sequences of actions. As such, each situation along the tree is
simply a history of the sequence of actions performed to reach it. The function symbol
do maps an action term and a situation term into a new situation term. For example,
do(Turn_on(Pump), S0) is the situation resulting from performing the action of turning
on the pump in situation S0. The distinguished predicate Poss(a, s) denotes that an action
a is possible to perform in situation s (e.g., Poss(Turn_on(Pump), S0)). As such, Poss
determines the subset of the situation tree consisting of situations that are possible in the
world. Finally, those properties or relations whose truth value can change from situation
to situation are referred to as fluents. For example, the property that the pump is on in
situation s could be represented by the fluent On(Pump, s).
In addition to the first-order language we use to axiomatize our domain, the situation
calculus also includes a set of foundational axioms, Σfound which establish properties of
our situations and situation tree ([15], and more recently [32]). Included in these axioms is
the definition of the binary relation < which provides a partial ordering over situations in
the subset of the situation tree that is Poss-ible. Finally, note that the situation calculus
language we employ in this paper is restricted to primitive, determinate actions. Our
language does not include a representation of time, concurrency or complex actions, but
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we are currently extending our results to more expressive dialects of the situation calculus
(e.g., [35]).
Throughout this paper, we adopt the following notational convention. All formulae are
universally quantified with maximum scope, unless stated otherwise. Variables begin with
lower-case letters and constants begin with upper-case letters.
3. Domain axiomatization: An example
Once again, the problem we address in this paper assumes the existence of a set of system
state constraints and our task is to integrate a representation of action, solving the frame,
ramification and qualification problems. In this paper, we forgo preliminary discussion on
transforming our original system state constraints into situation calculus state constraints
(see [25] for such a discussion), and assume that our axiomatizer has given us a situation
calculus domain axiomatization comprising the following sets of axioms:
TSC ∪ Tef ∪ Tnec ∪ TUNA ∪ TS0, (1)
where
• TSC is a set of state constraints, comprised of Tram, Tqual, and Tdomain:
– Tram is a set of ramification constraints,
– Tqual is a set of qualification constraints,
– Tdomain is a set of other domain constraints,
• Tef is a set of effect axioms,
• Tnec is a set of axioms describing the necessary conditions for actions,
• TUNA is a set of unique names axioms for actions, and
• TS0 is a set of axioms describing what is known of the initial situation, S0.
We describe these sets of axioms in further detail below. This axiomatization, while
combining state constraints and a representation of action, does not solve the frame,
ramification and qualification problems, and herein lies the problem we address in this
paper.
We illustrate the form of these axioms, and many of the concepts in this paper with a
simplified power plant feedwater system, depicted in Fig. 1. This example was extracted
from a real-world diagnosis problem [27]. The system consists of three potentially
malfunctioning components: a power supply (Power); a pump (Pump); and a boiler
(Boiler). The power supply provides power to both the pump and the boiler. The pump
fills the header with water, (Wtr_entering_hdr), which in turn provides water to the boiler,
producing steam. Alternately, the header can be filled manually (Mnl_filling). To make the
example more interesting, we assume that once water is entering the header, a siphon is
created and water will only stop entering the header when the siphon is disrupted. The
system also contains lights and an alarm which is triggered under certain conditions.
The predicate Ok is used throughout this example to designate that the component is
operating normally. This is an artifact of the diagnostic problem solving task from which
this example was drawn and has no bearing on our solution to the frame and ramification
problems. The axiomatization of the power plant feedwater systems presented in this paper
was designed to be the simplest representation that would suffice to illustrate important
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Fig. 1. Power plant feedwater system.
concepts. In order to reduce the number of literals and fluents in our axiomatization,
we have elected to violate the no-function-in-structure principle often followed by the
model-based reasoning community (e.g., [2]). Nevertheless, nothing in our proposed
representation scheme precludes us from following this principle. For a more extensive
axiomatization, see [25].
In order to describe the syntactic form of these axioms, we need the following definition
of a simple formula, following [15].
Definition 1 (Simple formula). A simple formula with respect to s is one in which only
domain-specific predicate symbols are mentioned (i.e., they do not mention Poss or <), in
which fluents do not include the function symbol do, in which there is no quantification
over sort situations, and in which there is at most one free situations variable.
TSC is a set of situation calculus state constraints. These incorporate the existing
system state constraints, indexed where appropriate with a situation term, s. TSC is in
turn comprised of sets of ramification constraints Tram, qualification constraints Tqual, and
domain constraints Tdomain. The differentiation of these constraints into different subsets
reflects the role that they play in the context of a theory of actions.
Tram, the set of ramification constraints, constrains the indirect effects of actions. For
each fluent F in our language, we may have both positive and negative ramification
constraints of the following syntactic form.
υ+F (Ex, s)⊃ F(Ex, s), (2)
υ−F (Ex, s)⊃¬F(Ex, s), (3)
where υ+F (Ex, s) and υ−F (Ex, s) are simple formulae whose variables are among Ex, a, s.
These ramification constraints are intended to be interpreted as causal if–then rules. I.e., if
υ+F (Ex, s) is true, then it causes F(Ex, s) to be true, and similarly, if υ−F (Ex, s) is true, then
it causes ¬F(Ex, s) to be true. Hence, we say that these ramification constraints causally
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influence fluent F . This directional or causal interpretation of the material implication
connective is stronger than the classical interpretation of ⊃. In the sections to follow, we
shall see how to enforce this intended interpretation. The set of ramification constraints for
our feedwater example is as follows.
Ok(Power, s)∧Ok(Pump, s)∧On(Pump, s)⊃Wtr_entering_hdr(s), (4)
Mnl_filling(s)⊃Wtr_entering_hdr(s), (5)
Wtr_entering_hdr(s)∧ Ok(Power, s)∧Ok(Boiler, s)
∧On(Boiler, s)⊃ Steam(s), (6)
¬(Wtr_entering_hdr(s)∧ Ok(Power, s)∧Ok(Boiler, s)
∧On(Boiler, s))⊃¬Steam(s). (7)
Axiom (4) states that if the power and pump are operating normally and if the pump is on,
then it causes water to be entering the header. If the pump were off and we performed an
action to turn it on, this axiom is intended to dictate that the indirect effect of turning on
the pump is that water will be entering the header.
Tqual, the set of qualification constraints further constrains when actions are possible to
perform. The set of qualification constraints for our feedwater example is as follows.
¬(On(Pump, s)∧Mnl_filling(s)). (8)
This axiom states that it is impossible for the pump to be on and the header to be manually
filling in the same situation. Thus, if the system were manually filling and we wanted
to turn on the pump, this axiom would preclude us from doing so, because the resulting
situation would violate this state constraint.
Tdomain, the set of domain constraints, plays no additional role in the context of a theory
of action. They simply serve to constrain the state of the system. The set of domain
constraints for our feedwater example is as follows.
Power 6= Pump 6= Boiler. (9)
This completes the axiomatization of our state constraints. Actions are axiomatized as a
set of effect axioms Tef , necessary conditions for actions Tnec, and unique names axioms
for actions TUNA, following the notation originally introduced in [34].
Tef , the set of effect axioms, describes the changes in the truth values of fluents as a
direct result of performing actions. For each fluent F in our language, we may have both
positive and negative effect axioms of the following syntactic form.
Poss(a, s)∧ γ+F (Ex, a, s)⊃ F(Ex,do(a, s)), (10)
Poss(a, s)∧ γ−F (Ex, a, s)⊃¬F(Ex,do(a, s)), (11)
where γ+F (Ex, a, s) and γ−F (Ex, a, s) are simple formulae whose variables are among Ex, a, s.
As with the ramification constraints, we say that these effect axioms causally influence
fluent F .
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The following axioms compose Tef for our feedwater example.
Poss(a, s)∧ a = Turn_on(x)⊃On(x,do(a, s)), (12)
Poss(a, s)∧ a = Turn_off (x)⊃¬On(x,do(a, s)), (13)
Poss(a, s)∧ a = Start_mnl_fill⊃Mnl_filling(do(a, s)), (14)
Poss(a, s)∧ a = Stop_mnl_fill⊃¬Mnl_filling(do(a, s)), (15)
Poss(a, s)∧ a = Disrupt_siphon⊃¬Wtr_entering_hdr(do(a, s)), (16)
Poss(a, s)∧ a = Blow(x)⊃¬Ok(x,do(a, s)), (17)
Poss(a, s)∧ a = Burn_out(x)⊃¬Ok(x,do(a, s)), (18)
Poss(a, s)∧ a = Fail(x)⊃¬Ok(x,do(a, s)), (19)
Poss(a, s)∧ a = Fix(x)⊃Ok(x,do(a, s)), (20)
Poss(a, s)∧ a = Aux_pwr⊃Ok(Power,do(a, s)). (21)
Axiom (12) states that if action a is possible in situation s, and a is the Turn_on(x) action,
then x will be On in the situation resulting from performing action a in situation s.
Tnec is the set of axioms representing the necessary conditions for individual actions to
be performed. For each action prototypeA in our language, necessary conditions are of the
following form.
Poss(A(Ex), s)⊃ piiA, (22)
where piiA is a simple formula with respect to s, whose free variables are among Ex, s.
The following axioms compose Tnec for our feedwater example.
Poss(Turn_on(x), s)⊃ x = Pump∨ x = Boiler, (23)
Poss(Turn_on(x), s)⊃¬On(x, s), (24)
Poss(Turn_off (x), s)⊃ x = Pump∨ x = Boiler, (25)
Poss(Turn_off (x), s)⊃On(x, s), (26)
Poss(Start_mnl_fill, s), (27)
Poss(Stop_mnl_fill, s), (28)
Poss(Disrupt_siphon, s)⊃¬Mnl_filling(s), (29)
Poss(Disrupt_siphon, s)⊃¬On(Pump, s), (30)
Poss(Blow(x), s)⊃ x = Boiler, (31)
Poss(Blow(x), s)⊃On(x, s), (32)
Poss(Blow(Boiler), s)⊃¬Wtr_entering_hdr(s), (33)
Poss(Burn_out(x), s)⊃ x = Pump, (34)
Poss(Burn_out(x), s)⊃On(x, s), (35)
Poss(Fail(x), s)⊃ x = Power, (36)
Poss(Fail(x), s)⊃Ok(x, s), (37)
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Poss(Fix(x), s)⊃¬On(x, s), (38)
Poss(Fix(x), s)⊃ x = Power ∨ x = Pump∨ x = Boiler, (39)
Poss(Aux_power, s). (40)
Axioms (29) and (30) state that if it is possible to disrupt the siphon, then the header must
not be manual filling and the pump must not be on. Note that many of the actions have no
necessary conditions and thus are always possible to perform.
TUNA is the set of unique names axioms for actions. They are of the form of (41) and
(42). For different action prototypes A and A′:
A(x1, . . . , xn) 6=A′(y1, . . . , ym), (41)
A(x1, . . . , xn)=A(y1, . . . , yn)⊃ x1 = y1 ∧ · · · ∧ xn = yn. (42)
Axiom (41) states that every action name refers to a distinct action. Axiom (42) states that
identical actions have identical arguments.
The following axioms compose TUNA for our feedwater example.
Turn_on(x1) 6= Turn_off (x2) 6= Start_mnl_fill 6= Stop_mnl_fill
6= Disrupt_siphon 6= Blow(x3) 6= Burn_out(x4)
6= Fail(x5) 6= Fix(x6) 6= Aux_power, (43)
Turn_on(x)= Turn_on(y)⊃ x = y, (44)
Turn_off (x)= Turn_off (y)⊃ x = y, (45)
Burn_out(x)= Burn_out(y)⊃ x = y, (46)
Blow(x)= Blow(y)⊃ x = y, (47)
Fail(x)= Fail(y)⊃ x = y, (48)
Fix(x)= Fix(y)⊃ x = y. (49)
This completes the axiomatization of actions.
TS0 is the initial database. It captures what is known of the initial state of the world. TS0
need not be complete, and usually isn’t. The following axioms might compose TS0 for our
feedwater example.
Ok(Power, S0)∧Ok(Pump, S0)∧Ok(Boiler, S0)∧¬On(Boiler, S0)
∧¬On(Pump, S0)∧¬Wtr_entering_hdr(S0)∧¬Mnl_filling(S0). (50)
4. The frame and ramification problems
In the previous section, we illustrated a domain axiomatization in the situation calculus
that combined state constraints and a representation of action. Once again, this domain
axiomatization comprises the set of axioms in (1). The job of the axiomatizer is done,
however we observe that these axioms do not provide a solution to the frame, ramification
and qualification problems. In this section, we explain the problems presented by the
existing axiomatization and propose a solution to the frame and ramification problems
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for what we argue to be a common class of state constraints. The qualification problem is
discussed in a subsequent section.
We adopt the view of Reiter and others (e.g., [28,33,39]) that successor state axioms and
action precondition axioms provide an effective solution to the frame and ramification
problems, and the qualification problem, respectively, because they are axiomatic,
monotonic and generally parsimonious. Indeed, Lin and Reiter [15] provided a semantic
definition of a solution to the frame and ramification problems for our situation calculus
language. The definition was based on minimal model semantics and a correspondence
was identified to successor state axioms. Unfortunately, this solution has its limitations.
Sometimes there is no minimal model. In other cases, there are multiple minimal models,
some of which do not reflect the intended interpretation of the ramification constraints and
effect axioms. Most importantly, there is no guaranteed procedure to produce a closed-form
solution.
Our contribution in this section is to provide an automatic procedure for generating a
closed-form solution to the frame and ramification problems for a common class of state
constraints. This solution is distinguished because it is closed-form and because it captures
the intended interpretation of TSC with respect to the theory.
4.1. The problem
We illustrate our problem with a subset of the feedwater system example. Consider
ramification constraint (4), i.e.,
Ok(Power, s)∧Ok(Pump, s)∧On(Pump, s)⊃Wtr_entering_hdr(s).
Assume the effect axioms are as defined in the previous section and assume for the sake
of simplicity that ∀a, s.Poss(a, s), i.e., that all actions are possible in all situations. Further
assume that everything is off, and everything is operating normally in the initial situation.
In particular,
Ok(Power, S0)∧Ok(Pump, S0)∧¬On(Pump, S0)∧¬Wtr_entering_hdr(S0).
Now assume the action Turn_on(Pump) is performed in S0, resulting in situation S1 =
do(Turn_on(Pump), S0). From effect axiom (12), we infer that On(Pump, S1). What does
ramification constraint (4) tell us about the indirect effects of this action? Recall that
ramification constraint (4) is logically equivalent to the following axiom.
¬Ok(Power, s)∨¬Ok(Pump, s)∨¬On(Pump, s)∨Wtr_entering_hdr(s) (51)
which holds for situation S0, but does not hold in situation S1, if we persist the truth status
of all fluents, except ¬On(Pump, S0), which becomes On(Pump, S1). We must restore the
satisfiability by changing the truth value of other fluents.
The intuition behind solutions to the frame problem is often to maximize the persistence
of the truth values of fluents between situations. I.e., don’t change the truth value of a fluent
unless you are forced to do so to maintain satisfiability. Lin and Reiter’s minimization
policy [15] is no different. If we maximize the persistence of fluents while maintaining
the satisfiability of (51), we produce three minimal models. The relevant portions of the
models are as follows.
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Ok(Power, S1) Ok(Pump, S1) On(Pump, S1) Wtr-entering-hdr(S1) (52)
¬Ok(Power, S1) Ok(Pump, S1) On(Pump, S1) ¬Wtr-entering-hdr(S1) (53)
Ok(Power, S1) ¬Ok(Pump, S1) On(Pump, S1) ¬Wtr-entering-hdr(S1) (54)
Clearly, the intended model is (52). We intend that turning on the pump results in water
entering the header. It does not result in a power supply that is not Ok, nor in a pump
that is not Ok. We intuitively know this to be the intended model because we have a
basic understanding of machinery. More importantly, the axiomatizer has communicated
the intended interpretation through the syntactic form of the ramification constraints. As
explained above, we intend for positive and negative ramification constraints of the form of
(2) and (3) to be interpreted as if υ+/−
F
(Ex, s) is true then it causes [¬]F(Ex, s), respectively,
to be true. This directional interpretation of the material implication connective, combined
with the notion of maximizing persistence eliminates models (53) and (54), while
designating (52), as the unique minimal model. Unfortunately, such an interpretation of
the material implication connective, ⊃, is stronger than the classical interpretation. In
solving the ramification problem we must enforce this intended interpretation, eliminating
unintended models.
It is interesting to note that the situation calculus ontology and in particular the
foundational axioms of the situation calculus already enforce such an interpretation of the
implication connective within the situation calculus effect axioms. I.e., given a positive or
negative effect axiom of the form of (10) or (11), if Poss(a, s)∧ γ [+/−]F (Ex, s) is true, then[¬]F(Ex,do(a, s)) is caused to be true. Since the situation tree cannot evolve from do(a, s)
to s (as defined by the foundational axioms) there are no other interpretations.
The idea of imposing a stronger, directional interpretation on the material implication
connective is not unique to this paper. The logic programming community has done this
for some time. In logic programming terminology [11], a literal is defined in a rule or set
of rules if it appears in the head of a rule or set of rules. Hence, in logic programming
terminology, ramification constraints (4) and (5) and effect axiom (16) serve to define
the fluent [¬]Wtr_entering_hdr. Logic programs realize this directional interpretation by
proceduralizing a type of minimization which causes literals contained in the body of
a rule to be minimized at a higher priority than those that appear in the head. Some
of the literature on reasoning about action (e.g., [14,18,42]) also captures the intuition
of exploiting directional influence by providing axiomatizations of state constraints with
an explicit non-classical causal connective or a distinguished Causes predicate. We will
discuss the relationship of this work to ours, at the end of this paper.
In the section to follow, we show how to transform our situation calculus domain
axiomatization (1), into another situation calculus domain axiomatization that captures all
and only its intended interpretation.
4.2. The solution
In this section we provide a transformation procedure that leads us to a closed-form
solution to the frame and ramification problems for axiomatizations whose syntactic
representation of ramification constraints and effect axioms collectively form what we refer
to as a solitary stratified theory.
98 S.A. McIlraith / Artificial Intelligence 116 (2000) 87–121
4.2.1. Preliminaries
Intuitively, a set of effect axioms and ramification constraints forms a solitary stratified
theory if the directed graph representing the causal influence between fluents is acyclic.
Fig. 2 illustrates the causal influence graph for our feedwater example. A solitary stratified
theory separates fluents into a partition L= (L1,L2, . . . ,Ln), and decomposes the axioms
T into strata (T1, T2, . . . , Tn), such that the axioms that causally influence a fluent Fi ∈ Li
are placed in stratum Ti . Further, the fluents that participate in causally influencing Fi , i.e.,
the fluents in the antecedents of the ramification constraints and effect axioms for Fi , are
all drawn from Lj , j < i . The stratification of a solitary stratified theory is not unique and
its determination is easily automated.
The notion of a “solitary stratified theory” is derivative of both solitary theories [12] and
stratified logic programs (e.g., [11]). For those familiar with stratified logic programs, a
solitary stratified theory is a stratified logic program that allows negation in the head of
rules. It further differs from a stratified logic program in that the criterion that defines
a stratum applies a strictly < relation, rather than 6. The intuitive description above
should be sufficient for the reader to understand the closed-form solution presented in
this section. Nevertheless, we provide the following more formal definition of a solitary
stratified theory. The terminology and notation is derivative of definitions in [12] in order
to facilitate our semantic justification in Section 7.
Definition 2 (Solitary stratified theory). Suppose T is a theory in the language of the
situation calculus with domain fluents, L. T is a solitary stratified theory with stratification
(T1, T2, . . . , Tn), and partition (L1,L2, . . . ,Ln), where L1 ∪L2 ∪ · · · ∪Ln = L, if T is the
union
T1 ∪ T2 ∪ · · · ∪ Tn
of sets of axioms Ti where for each stratum, Ti is solitary with respect to Li ; that is, each
Ti can be written as the union
(Di 6¬Li )∪ (Ei 6 Li ),
Fig. 2. Causal influence in feedwater example.
S.A. McIlraith / Artificial Intelligence 116 (2000) 87–121 99
where
(1) Li is the set of fluents, Fi , such that Fi is only causally influenced by axioms in Ti ;
(2) Di 6¬Li is an abbreviation for a set of formulae of the form
(Di ⊃¬Fi),
one for each fluent Fi ∈Li , where eachDi is a formula containing no fluents drawn
from Li ∪ · · · ∪Ln;
(3) Ei 6 Li is an abbreviation for a set of formulae of the form
(Ei ⊃ Fi),
one for each fluent Fi ∈Li , where each Ei is a formula containing no fluents drawn
from Li ∪ · · · ∪Ln.
Example 1. In our feedwater example, T = Tram ∪ Tef is a solitary stratified theory with
partition (L1,L2,L3) and stratification (T1, T2, T3), where
• L1 = {On(Pump, s), On(Boiler, s), Ok(Pump, s), Ok(Boiler, s), Ok(Power, s),
Mnl_filling(s)}.
T1 comprises all the effect axioms except (16). In particular, D1 6 ¬L1 comprises
the set of negative effect axioms, i.e., (13), (15), (17), (18) and (19), and E1 6 L1
comprises the set of positive effect axioms, i.e., (12), (14), (20) and (21).
• L2 = {Wtr_entering_hdr(s)}.
T2 comprises ramification constraints (4) and (5) and effect axiom (16).
• L3 = {Steam(s)}.
T3 comprises ramification constraints (6) and (7).
With our definition of solitary stratified theory in hand, we are now prepared to present
a solution to the frame and ramification problems.
4.2.2. A closed-form solution
In what follows, we present a syntactic manipulation procedure that results in a closed-
form solution to the frame and ramification problems for solitary stratified theory T =
Tef ∪ Tram. The procedure takes effect axioms, ramification constraints and the (causal)
partition of their fluents as input, and under a completeness assumption, transforms them
into a set of successor state axioms. The ideas presented in this section draw some intuition
from Reiter’s solution to the frame problem without state constraints [33]. Our solution is
predicated on our notion of causal influence and on an appeal to a completeness assumption
that enables us to generate explanation closure axioms (e.g., [28,39]).
Transformation Procedure. Let T = Tram ∪ Tef be a solitary stratified theory, with
partition (L1,L2, . . . ,Ln) and stratification (T1, T2, . . . , Tn). Let Tef be comprised of
positive and negative effect axioms of the form of (10) and (11). Let Tram be comprised
of positive and negative ramification constraints of the form of (2) and (3). Note that
henceforth, action and predicate arguments, Ex, will not be explicitly represented in
canonical formulae.
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Step 1. From the effect axioms, Tef , and the ramification constraints, Tram, generate
positive and negative general causal influence axioms, of the following form.
General Causal Influence Axioms. For every fluent Fi ∈ Li ,
[Poss(a, s)∧](γ+Fi(a, s)∨ υ+Fi (do(a, s)))⊃ Fi(do(a, s)), (55)
[Poss(a, s)∧](γ−Fi(a, s)∨ υ−Fi (do(a, s)))⊃¬Fi(do(a, s)), (56)
where [Poss(a, s)∧] indicates that Poss(a, s) may or may not occur.
Example 2. Positive and negative general causal influence axioms for the fluent On(x, s) ∈
L1 are
Poss(a, s)∧ a = Turn_on(x)⊃On(x,do(a, s)), (57)
Poss(a, s)∧ a = Turn_off (x)⊃¬On(x,do(a, s)). (58)
Positive and negative general causal influence axioms for Wtr_entering_hdr(s) ∈L2 are
(Ok(Power,do(a, s))∧Ok(Pump,do(a, s))∧On(Pump,do(a, s)))
∨ Mnl_filling(do(a, s))⊃Wtr_entering_hdr(do(a, s)), (59)
Poss(a, s)∧ a = Disrupt_siphon⊃¬Wtr_entering_hdr(do(a, s)). (60)
Step 2. Make the following causal completeness assumption.
Causal Completeness Assumption. All the conditions underwhich an action a can
lead, directly or indirectly, to fluent F becoming true or false in the successor state are
characterized in the positive and negative general causal influence axioms for fluent F .
Step 3. From the causal completeness assumption, generate explanation closure axioms.
We argue that if action a is possible in s and if the truth value of fluent Fi changes from
true to false upon doing action a in situation s, then either γ−Fi (a, s) is true or υ−Fi (do(a, s))
is true. An analogous argument can be made when the truth value of fluent F changes from
false to true upon doing action a in situation s. This assumption is captured in the following
positive and negative explanation closure axioms.
Explanation Closure Axioms. For every fluent Fi ∈Li ,
Poss(a, s)∧ Fi(s)∧¬Fi(do(a, s))⊃ γ−Fi (a, s)∨ υ−Fi (do(a, s)), (61)
Poss(a, s)∧¬Fi(s)∧ Fi(do(a, s))⊃ γ+Fi (a, s)∨ υ+Fi (do(a, s)). (62)
Step 4. From the positive and negative general causal influence axioms and the
explanation closure axioms, define intermediate successor state axioms for each fluent Fi .
The successor state axioms are distinguished as intermediate because in the next step,
we simplify them through a further syntactic transformation.
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Intermediate Successor State Axioms. For every fluent Fi ∈ Li ,
Poss(a, s)⊃ [Fi(do(a, s))≡Φ∗Fi ], (63)
where
Φ∗Fi ≡ γ+Fi (a, s)∨ υ+Fi (do(a, s))∨
(
F(s)∧¬(γ−Fi (a, s)∨ υ−Fi (do(a, s)))
)
.
The set of intermediate successor state axioms is defined as the set,
TISS =
⋃
i=1,...,n
TISSi ,
where TISSi is the set of intermediate successor state axioms for fluents Fi ∈Li .
The formulae (63) and (66) below may be understood as follows,
Poss(a, s)⊃ [Fi(do(a, s))≡
an action made it true
∨a ramification made it true
∨Fi was already true in s
∧ neither an action nor a ramification made it false].
Example 3. Intermediate successor state axioms for the fluent On(x, s) ∈ L1 and for the
fluent Wtr_entering_hdr(s) ∈ L2 are as follows.
Poss(a, s)⊃ [On(x,do(a, s))≡ a = Turn_on(x)
∨ (On(x, s)∧ a 6= Turn_off (x))], (64)
Poss(a, s)⊃ [Wtr_entering_hdr(do(a, s))≡
Mnl_filling(do(a, s))
∨ (Ok(Power,do(a, s))∧Ok(Pump,do(a, s))∧On(Pump,do(a, s)))
∨Wtr_entering_hdr(s)∧ a 6=Disrupt_siphon]. (65)
At this point we could consider ourselves done. Indeed, the intermediate successor state
axioms provide a solution to the frame and ramification problems. They capture only
the intended interpretation of our effect axioms and ramification constraints. In many
instances, we may actually stop with this representation, which is relatively compact.
Note however that the intermediate successor state axioms can be further compiled.
In particular, observe the intermediate successor state axiom defining the conditions
underwhich Fi(do(a, s)) will be true is itself defined in terms of other fluents relativized to
situation do(a, s). For example, the successor state axiom for Wtr_entering_hdr is defined
in terms of Mnl_filling(do(a, s)), Ok(Power,do(a, s)), etc. Each of these fluents is itself
defined in other intermediate successor state axioms. In the final step of our transformation
procedure, we use regression rewriting to rewrite these intermediate successor state axioms
so that our final successor state axioms are defined in terms of simple formulae, and hence
contain no reference to fluents relativized to do(a, s).
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Definition 3 (Regression (e.g., [33,43]). Regression is a recursive rewriting procedure
used here to reduce the nesting of the do function in situation terms. If F is a fluent with
(intermediate) successor state axiom
Poss(a, s)⊃ F(Ex,do(a, s))≡ΦF (Ex, a, s)
in TSS then the regression of F(t1, . . . , tn,do(a, s)),
RSS[F(t1, . . . , tn,do(α,σ ))] =ΦF |x1,...,xn,a,st1,...,tn,α,σ .
Regression generalizes over formulae as one would expect. See Appendix A or [25] for
a detailed description.
The challenge is that we want this rewriting to terminate in a set of simple formulae. For
example, regressing the following two intermediate successor state axioms
Poss(a, s)⊃ [F(do(a, s))≡G(do(a, s))],
Poss(a, s)⊃ [G(do(a, s))≡ F(do(a, s))]
will never terminate. The merit of our solution is that for solitary stratified theories,
regression rewriting will terminate and it will lead to final successor state axioms defined
in terms of simple formulae. In Step 5, we describe the final form of our successor state
axioms. In Theorem 1 we prove that regression is guaranteed to terminate and to be defined
in terms of simple formulae.
Step 5. By regressing the intermediate successor state axioms, generate ( final) successor
state axioms.
Successor State Axioms. For every fluent Fi ∈ Li ,
Poss(a, s)⊃ [Fi(do(a, s))≡ΦFi ], (66)
where unlike Φ∗Fi , ΦFi is a simple formula of the following form,
ΦFi =Ri−1SS [Φ∗Fi ]
≡Ri−1SS [γ+Fi (a, s)∨ υ+Fi (do(a, s))∨ (Fi(s)∧¬(γ−Fi (a, s)∨ υ−Fi (do(a, s))))]
≡ γ+Fi (a, s)∨Ri−1SS [υ+Fi (do(a, s))]
∨ (F(s)∧¬(γ−Fi (a, s)∨Ri−1SS [υ−Fi (do(a, s))])). (67)
Ri−1SS [φ] is the repeated regression of formula φ under successor state axioms TSS1, . . . ,
TSSi−1 . The set of successor state axioms is TSS =
⋃
i=1,...,n TSSi , where TSSi is the set of
axioms for fluents Fi ∈Li .
Example 4. Axiom (64) is both the intermediate and the final successor state axiom
for fluent On(Pump, s). The intermediate successor state axiom (65) transforms into the
following successor state axiom under regression.
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Poss(a, s)⊃ [Wtr_entering_hdr(do(a, s))≡
a = Start_mnl_fill
∨ (Mnl_filling(s)∧ a 6= Stop_mnl_fill)
∨[(a 6= Fail(Power)∧ (Ok(Power, s)∨ a = Aux_power ∨ a = Fix(Power)))
∧ (a 6= Burn_out(Pump)∧ (Ok(Pump, s)∨ a = Fix(Pump)))
∧ (a = Turn_on(Pump)∨ (On(Pump, s)∧ a 6= Turn_off (Pump)))]
∨ (Wtr_entering_hdr(s)∧ a 6=Disrupt_siphon)]. (68)
Proposition 1. Suppose T = Tef ∪ Tram is a solitary stratified theory with intermediate
successor state axioms TISS and (final) successor state axioms TSS as defined above.
Further suppose,
• RISS[φ] denotes the repeated regression of φ under TISS,
• RISSi [φ] denotes the repeated regression of φ under TISSi ,
• RiISS[φ] denotes the repeated regression of φ under TISS1, TISS2, . . . , TISSi .
Corresponding terminology holds for successor state axioms TSS.
Then for every fluent F1 ∈ L1, the successor state axiom for F1 is identical to its
intermediate successor state axioms, and is of the following general form.
Poss(a, s)⊃ [F1(do(a, s))≡ γ+F1(a, s)∨ (F1(s)∧¬γ−F1(a, s))].
More generally, TISS1 ≡ TSS1 .
Further, for any formula φ, RiISS[φ] =RiSS[φ], and for any fluent Fi(Ex,do(a, s)),
RiISS[Fi(Ex,do(a, s))] =RiSS[Fi(Ex,do(a, s))] =RSSi [Fi(Ex,do(a, s))].
Since T is a solitary stratified theory, if Φ∗Fi mentions fluents relativized to situation
do(a, s), then those fluents are drawn from {L1, . . . ,Li−1}. Also observe that ΦF1 is
a simple formula. Hence it follows that if RSSi−1[ΦFi ] mentions fluents relativized to
situation do(a, s), then those fluents are drawn from {L1, . . . ,Li−2}. More generally, it
follows thatRi−1SS [ΦFi ] is a simple formula.
Theorem 1. Suppose T = Tef ∪ Tram, is a solitary stratified theory with intermediate
successor state axioms TISS and (final) successor state axioms TSS as described above.
Then for any fluent Fi ∈L,Ri−1SS [Fi(do(a, s)] is a simple formula. More generally, for any
successor state axiom of the form of (66),Ri−1SS [ΦFi ] is a simple formula.
The successor state axioms and the intermediate successor state axioms provide alternate
closed-form solutions to the frame and ramification problems. In our axiomatization (1), we
may replace Tram and Tef by T S0ram, the ramification constraints relativized to situation S0,
and either TSS or TISS (henceforth denoted T[I ]SS), the intermediate or final successor state
axioms. In Section 7 we also show that this closed-form solution is conditioned on a con-
sistency assumption that ensures that either an action is impossible to perform, or that the
action cannot directly or indirectly make a fluent both true and false in the same situation.
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5. The qualification problem
Our new domain axiomatization,
TUNA ∪ T[I ]SS ∪ TS0 ∪ T S0ram ∪ Tqual ∪ Tdomain ∪ Tnec (69)
now provides a solution to the frame and ramification problems. It remains to address
the qualification problem. As previously observed the qualification constraints in Tqual
can further restrict those situations s in which an action a is Poss-ible. We propose to
use Lin and Reiter’s solution [15], to determine a set of action precondition axioms TAP.
It transforms the necessary conditions for actions, Tnec, and the qualification constraints,
Tqual, into a set of action precondition axioms, TAP, under an assumption of domain closure
on actions. Following their results, we add one more step to our procedure.
Step 6. Define one action precondition axiom for each action prototype A(Ex) as follows.
Action Pecondition Axioms.
Poss(A(Ex), s)≡ΠA ∧
∧
C∈Tqual
ΠC, (70)
where
ΠC ≡RSS[C(do(A(Ex), s))]. (71)
ΠA ≡ pi1A ∨ · · · ∨ pinA for each piiA of (22) in Tnec. RSS is the repeated regression operator
under the successor state axioms, TSS. Recall that following Proposition 1, this regression
is equivalent to regression with the intermediate successor state axioms.
Example 5. Consider the qualification constraint (8),
¬(On(Pump, s)∧Mnl_filling(s)),
effect axioms (12) and (14),
Poss(a, s)∧ a = Turn_on(x)⊃On(x,do(a, s)),
Poss(a, s)∧ a = Start_mnl_fill⊃Mnl_filling(do(a, s)),
and necessary conditions for actions, (23), (24) and (27),
Poss(Turn_on(x), s)⊃ x = Pump∨ x = Boiler,
Poss(Turn_on(x), s)⊃¬On(x, s),
Poss(Start_mnl_fill, s).
The qualification constraint dictates that it is not possible to perform the action
Turn_on(Pump) when the fluent Mnl_filling(s) holds, and similarly that it is not possible
to perform the action Start_mnl_fill when the fluent On(Pump, s) holds.
The action precondition axioms for Start_mnl_fill and Turn_on(x) following Step 6 of
our procedure are:
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Poss(Turn_on(x), s)≡ (x = Pump∨ x = Boiler)
∧¬On(x, s)
∧ (x = Pump⊃¬MnL_filling(s)), (72)
Poss(Start_mnl_fill, s)≡¬On(Pump, s). (73)
The action precondition axioms provide a closed-form solution to the qualification
problem under the assumption of domain closure on actions. Since we have compiled Tnec
and Tqual into TAP, we can replace Tnec and Tqual by TAP and T S0qual in our theory, where
T
S0
qual is the set of qualification constraints relativized to situation S0. We also add a domain
closure axiom for actions, TDCA.
6. Discussion of the closed-form solution
Incorporating the results of the previous sections yields the following final domain
axiomatization which integrates our syntactically restricted state constraints and a
representation of action, while solving the frame, ramification and qualification problems:
TUNA ∪ TDCA ∪ T[I ]SS ∪ TAP ∪ TS0 ∪ T S0SC ∪ Tdomain, (74)
where
• TUNA is a set of unique name axioms for actions.
• TDCA is a domain closure axiom for actions.
• T[I ]SS is either a set of intermediate or final successor state axioms, derived from Tef
and Tram under a causal completeness assumption.
• TAP is a set of action precondition axioms, derived from Tnec, Tqual and T[I ]SS under
a causal completeness assumption.
• TS0 is a set of axioms describing what is known of the initial state of the world.
• T S0SC is the set of state constraints, TSC, relativized to situation S0.• TSC is a set of state constraints. It is comprised of Tram, Tqual, and Tdomain.
• Tram is a set of ramification constraints.
• Tqual is a set of qualification constraints.
• Tdomain is a set of domain constraints. These are the state constraints which are neither
qualification constraints, nor ramification constraints.
Recall that in Section 1 we presented three criteria for evaluating solutions to the
frame, ramification and qualification problems, following Shanahan [40]. We claim that
our closed-form solution to the frame and ramification problems adheres to these criteria,
as does Lin and Reiter’s solution to the qualification problem, which we have adopted to
complete our representation. We discuss the criteria with respect to our solution to the
frame and ramification problems.
On the subject of representational parsimony, it was previously shown that successor
state axioms provide a representationally parsimonious solution to the frame problem in
the absence of the ramification problem [32]. In particular, the brute-force approach to
addressing the frame problem requires the addition of 2×F ×A frame axioms (where F
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is the number of fluents in the language andA is the number of actions in the language). In
contrast, a successor state axiom solution to the frame problem requires only F successor
state axioms. When we use successor state axioms to solve the ramification problem as
well, there will still only beF successor state axioms, however the length of each successor
state axiom will be increased.
The most compact solution to the frame and ramification problems is provided by the
intermediate successor state axioms. In this case, the length of each axiom is roughly
proportional to the number of actions, and the number of ramification constraints that
directly affect the truth value of the fluent, i.e., the number of effect axioms and ramification
constraints for a fluent. Under the assumption that few actions and ramifications directly
affect any individual fluent, the intermediate successor state axioms remain short, and the
representation is compact. The intermediate successor state axioms also have the virtue
of preserving the structure and compositionality of the representation—something that is
important for model-based reasoning applications as well as for elaboration tolerance. In
contrast, the (final) successor state axioms represent a compiled, and thus less compact,
version of the intermediate successor state axioms. In particular, we still have F successor
state axioms, but the length of each axiom will be proportional to the number of actions
and ramification constraints that indirectly, as well as directly, affect a fluent. Arguably
this is still quite small, however it will grow with the size of the stratification, and has the
potential to explode. So, on the basis of parsimony, the intermediate successor state axioms
are a superior representation. In practice, there may be instances where the advantages
of the precompilation into final successor state axioms, outweigh those of parsimony.
Such a trade-off between parsimony and the potential runtime computational advantages
of precompilation is an issue best addressed with respect to the specific domain and
application.
On the subject of the expressive flexibility criterion, we believe our successor state
axiom solution will score well. While there is little in this paper to demonstrate this point,
solutions to the frame problem based on successor state axioms have been extended to
knowledge producing actions [38], to complex actions [10], and to aspects of continuous
domains [29,35]. Preliminary investigation indicates that our solution to the ramification
problem extends to these problems in the same straightforward manner.
Finally, on the subject of elaboration tolerance, our successor state axiom solution again
scores well. As noted above, intermediate successor state axioms are more amenable
to elaboration than final successor state axioms, but elaboration is straightforward and
automatable in both cases. If new actions, effect axioms or ramification constraints are
added to the theory, they can be incorporated by a simple rewrite of the successor state
axioms for the affected fluents, following the syntactic form provided in (63) or (66).
One potential criticism of our closed-form solution is that we are relying on the syntactic
form of our axiomatization. In particular, we are relying on the fact that the axiomatizer has
written the ramification constraints so that the implication sign may be correctly interpreted
as causal influence. This need not be the case. Note that for any such axiomatization, we
may instead be given the causal relationship between fluents, i.e., the causal influence
graph, or a separate data structure describing the causal influence, and use this to generate
the stratification and hence the successor state axioms.
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A second potential criticism is that our closed-form solution is predicated on a loose
appeal to a completeness assumption. We address this in the section to follow by providing
independent semantic justification for our closed-form solution.
A third potential criticism of our closed-form solution is that it is restricted to the class
of solitary stratified theories. While we can make no definitive claims about the frequency
of occurrence of solitary stratified theories in general, they appear to be common in the
representations of engineering artifacts. In these systems, the causal influence between
fluents often reflects physical connectivity of components and subcomponents.
To close our discussion, we’d like to make the important observation that this represen-
tation can be viewed as an executable specification because it is easily realized in Prolog
by exploiting Prolog’s completion semantics and simply replacing the equivalence signs,
characteristic of T[I ]SS and TAP, by implications [32]. The Lloyd–Topor transformation [17]
must then be applied, to convert the resultant theory into Prolog clausal form. Indeed, as
an interesting aside, in the sections to follow we show that our successor state axioms are
semantically characterized as the outcome of computing a particular prioritized circum-
scription. Perfect models in logic programs have a prioritized circumscription semantics
[31], thus the logic program produced from translation of our successor state axioms also
has a perfect model semantics. This is discussed more thoroughly in [25].
7. Semantic justification
In previous sections, we presented a closed-form solution to the frame and ramification
problems for syntactically restricted ramification constraints and effect axioms that
collectively form a solitary stratified theory. Our solution involved compiling effect axioms
and ramification constraints into successor state axioms. Unfortunately, the compilation
procedure, and as a consequence, our closed-form solution are predicated on a loose appeal
to a completeness assumption, and on a causal interpretation of the material implication
connective. In the rest of this paper we provide an independent semantic justification for
our closed-form solution. In particular we show how to specify and compute a solution to
the frame and ramification problems using minimal model semantics and circumscription.
This represents the second major technical contribution of this paper.
We achieve our semantic justification as follows. Exploiting the causal influence
ordering among fluents that induces a solitary stratified theory, we specify a nonmonotonic
solution to the frame and ramification problems in terms of a prioritized minimization
policy. We show that under a consistency assumption, our successor state axioms (66) are
solutions to the frame and ramification problems with respect to the specification. We also
show that any solution with respect to our specification is also a solution with respect to
Lin and Reiter’s specification [15]. In Section 7.2, we observe that our minimization policy
is equivalent to a particular instance of prioritized circumscription, where the prioritization
is equivalent to the causal influence ordering. Through simple syntactic renaming and by
exploiting results from Lifschitz on computing circumscription (e.g., [12]), we show that
under a consistency assumption, computing this prioritized circumscription results in the
computation of our successor state axioms. This result establishes the correctness of our
closed-form solution with respect to our nonmonotonic specification. Finally, we use these
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results to show that, in the case where there are no ramification constraints, computing the
circumscription results in the successor state axioms defined by Reiter in his solution to
the frame problem [33].
7.1. Minimization policy
In this section we define a prioritized minimization policy and use it to specify what
counts as a solution to the frame and ramification problems for solitary stratified theories.
To solve the frame problem, we wish to capture the intuition that things normally stay the
same, and that when they do not, it is abnormal. We express the notion of abnormality
through the distinguished predicate abFi (a, s), one for each fluent Fi in our domain
axiomatization. The predicate abFi (a, s) is an abbreviation for ¬[Fi(s) ≡ Fi(do(a, s))],
i.e., it is ab-normal if Fi changes truth value from one situation to the next.
We wish to minimize abFi (a, s), and in so doing capture the intuition that in the absence
of something abnormal, the truth value of a fluent persists after an action is performed. In
order to define our minimization policy, we must differentiate between an initial situation
and the situation resulting from performing an action, which we will refer to henceforth
as the resulting situation. Like the minimization policies advocated by Lin and Shoham
[16] and Lin and Reiter [15], our policy minimizes abFi (a, s) with Poss(a, s) and the truth
status of fluents in the initial situation, Fi(Ex, s), remaining fixed. Fluents in the resulting
situation, Fi(do(a, s)), are allowed to vary.
While we share basic minimization principles with previously advocated solutions to
the frame and ramification problems, our minimization policy is distinguished because
it places a priority ordering over the minimization of the predicate abFi (a, s). The
ordering is derived from the partitioning of fluents in our domain axiomatization into
L = (L1,L2, . . . ,Ln), according to causal influence. Under this partition, fluents in Li
are only causally influenced by fluents in Lj , j < i . This dictates the following priority
ordering for our minimization policy
Ab1 >Ab2 > · · ·>Abn,
where Abi is a tuple containing the abnormality predicate abFi (a, s) for each fluent Fi ∈
Li . Ab1(a, s) is assigned the highest priority for minimization, and Abn(a, s) is assigned
the lowest priority. Hence, the priority ordering corresponds to our causal influence
ordering. This causal influence ordering can be articulated independently, or it can be
communicated by an axiomatizer through the strategic placement of material implication
connectives in the axioms of our theory, T = Tef ∪ Tram, as illustrated earlier in this paper.
The use of material implication to reflect causal influence results in a solitary stratified
theory, with a stratification corresponding to our priority ordering.
Under this prioritized minimization policy, each abFi (a, s) is minimized, even at the
expense of increasing the extent of predicates abFi+1(a, s), . . . ,abFn(a, s) and the truth
value of fluents in the resulting situation, Fk(do(a, s)), k = 1, . . . , n. As we will see,
this prioritized minimization policy captures our intended solution to the frame and
ramification problems for solitary stratified theories.
To get a better grasp of the intuition behind this minimization policy, we may think
of causal change as temporal change that we have abstracted away in our knowledge
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representation scheme. Hence, the causal ordering dictated by our causal influence graph,
captured in the grouping of fluents in our solitary stratified theory, and exploited in the
prioritization of our minimization policy, can be though of as an abstraction of a temporal
ordering on the necessary propagation of change. With this intuition in mind, we can think
of our minimization policy as minimizing causal change according to this implicit temporal
ordering, or explicit causal ordering. Since changes in fluents inL1 cause changes in fluents
in L2, . . . ,LN , and changes in fluents in L1 and L2 cause changes in fluents in L3, . . . ,Ln,
and so on, we can minimize overall change by minimizing change following this causal
ordering, and hence minimize the propagation of change.
The definition of the minimization policy follows. At first glance, it may look complex
and daunting, rather than simple and intuitive. We elected to express it this way to be
mathematically precise, and to relate it to previous work on the frame and ramification
problems. As will be shown in the section to follow, our nonmonotonic specification
reduces to a simple prioritized circumscription, minimizing causal change following our
causal influence ordering.
Let s and a denote variables of sort situation and action respectively. Further, let σs ,
σa and σd denote assignment functions from free variables of sorts situation, action and
domain, respectively. For the purposes of this definition only, we explicitly include action
and predicate arguments Es.
Definition 4 (Prioritized model preference). Suppose, T is a solitary stratified theory
with stratification (T1, . . . , Tn), domain fluents L, and partition (L1,L2, . . . ,Ln), where
L =⋃ni=1Li . Suppose abFi (Ex, a, s) is an abbreviation for ¬[Fi(Ex, s) ≡ Fi(Ex,do(a, s))]
andM andM′ are models of T .
ModelM′ is preferred over modelM with respect to variable assignment to situations,
σs (denoted byM′ <σsM), iff the following conditions hold.
(1) M andM′ have the same universe of discourse.
(2) M and M′ agree on their interpretation of everything, including Poss, with the
potential exception of domain fluents.
(3) (a) M andM′ agree on the extensions of every fluent Fi(Ex, s), in every stratum Ti ,
i = 1, . . . , n.
I.e., for any assignment σa and σd , and any fluent Fi(Ex, s), i = 1, . . . , n,
M′, σs, σd |= Fi(Ex, s) iff M, σs, σd |= Fi(Ex, s).
(b) For some i , 16 i 6 n,
M and M′ agree on the extensions of every abFj (Ex, a, s) in stratum Tj ,
j = 1, . . . , i − 1, and the extensions of abFi (Ex, a, s) in M′ are a subset of the
extensions of abFi (Ex, a, s) inM.
I.e., for some i and any assignment σa and σd , and any fluent Fj (Ex, s), j =
1, . . . , i − 1,
M′, σs, σa, σd |= Poss(a, s)∧¬abFj (Ex, a, s)
iff
M, σs, σa, σd |= ¬abFj (Ex, a, s)
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and for some fluent Fi(Ex, s), there are two assignments σa and σd such that
M, σs, σa, σd |= Poss(a, s)∧ abFi (Ex, a, s)
but
M′, σs, σa, σd |= ¬abFi (Ex, a, s).
Definition 5 (Minimal model). M is a minimal model of T if there is no M′ and no
variable assignment to situations σs such thatM′ <σsM.
From our prioritized model preference, we provide a semantic specification for a
solution to the frame and ramification problems for our syntactically restricted theories. In
particular, we specify that under the prioritized minimization policy, the minimal models
of our restricted theories prescribe solutions to the frame and ramification problem. Recall
that Σfound is the set of foundational axioms of the situation calculus [15].
Definition 6 (Semantic specification). Suppose
Σ =Σfound ∪ TUNA ∪ Tef ∪ Tram, (75)
where T = Tef ∪ Tram is a solitary stratified theory, with stratification (T1, T2, . . . , Tn),
domain fluents L, and partition (L1,L2, . . . ,Ln), such that L=⋃ni=1Li . Finally suppose
M is a minimal model of Σ .
ThenM captures a solution to the frame and ramification problem for Σ .
As observed in Section 4.1, Lin and Reiter previously defined a solution to the frame
and ramification problem as the minimal models of our same Σ under a similar non-
prioritized minimization policy [15]. Interestingly, our minimization policy collapses to
Lin and Reiter’s policy when n= 1.
Proposition 2. If M is a minimal model of Σ , then M is also a minimal model of Σ
under Lin and Reiter’s minimization policy, outlined in [15].
Remark 1. If M captures a solution to the frame and ramification problem for Σ as
specified in Definition 6, then it also meets Lin and Reiter’s general specification for a
solution to the frame and ramification problem, as outlined in [15].
To contrast our minimization policy to Lin and Reiter’s, recall that their specification
provides criteria for a solution to the frame and ramification problems. Unlike our
specification which is limited to a syntactically restricted class of state constraints, their
specification need not yield a minimal model, and indeed can yield multiple minimal
models, some of which will not reflect the intended interpretation of the effect axioms and
ramification constraints. Further, as we show in the pages to follow, our specification for
our restricted theories guarantees a procedure to generate a closed-form solution, whereas
Lin and Reiter’s does not.
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Next we demonstrate the relationship between our semantically specified solution to the
frame and ramification problems and the successor state axioms we defined in (66). This
relationship is predicated on a consistency assumption.
Assumption 1 (Consistency Assumption). For each fluent Fi ∈ Li assume that:
TUNA ∪ Tnec |= (∀a, s).Poss(a, s)⊃
¬[(γ+Fi (a, s)∨R[υ+Fi (do(a, s))])
∧ (γ−Fi (a, s)∨R[υ−Fi (do(a, s))])], (76)
whereR[φ] is the regression of φ under successor state axioms TSS.
This consistency assumption may be understood as follows. The unique names
assumptions for actions and the necessary conditions for action, TUNA and Tnec enforce
that if an action is possible in a situation, i.e., Poss(a, s), then
Poss(a, s)⊃ It is not the case that both
(an action or a ramification makes Fi(do(a, s)) true)
∧ (an action or a ramification makes Fi(do(a, s)) false).
The consistency assumption ensures that either an action is impossible to perform in
situation s, or that performing the action will not result in a situation where a fluent is
determined to be both true and false by some combination of effect axioms and ramification
constraints. The unique names axioms, TUNA ensure that no action has the effect of making
a fluent both true and false in the same situation. The necessary conditions for actions, Tnec
dictate that an action is impossible to perform in a situation if performing the action results
in an inconsistency between the effect of the action and the intended effects of ramification
constraints.
The following theorem states that under Consistency Assumption 1, if we replace the
effect axioms, Tef and ramification constraints, Tram by the successor state axioms of
(66), TSS and the ramification constraints relativized to the initial situation, T S0ram, that the
resulting theory will entail the ramification constraints, not only at situation S0, but via
the successor state axioms, at every situation s that follows S0 on the tree of Poss-ible
situations, i.e., those situations s such that S0 6 s. (Recall that 6 over situations is defined
inΣfound.) This enables us to exclude Tram and Tef from our theory, provided TSS and T S0ram
are present.
Theorem 2. SupposeΣ is the theory defined in Definition 6 and TSS is the set of successor
state axioms derived from Tef and Tram of Σ as per (66). Further, assume Consistency
Assumption 1 holds.
Then for every ramification constraint (∀s).C(s) ∈ Tram,
Σfound ∪ TUNA ∪ TSS ∪ T S0ram |= (∀s).S0 6 s ⊃ C(s),
where T S0ram is the set of ramification constraints relativized to S0,
T S0ram = {C(S0) | (∀s).C(s) ∈ Tram}.
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The following theorem proves that, under Consistency Assumption 1, the successor state
axioms provide a solution to the frame and ramification problems, in keeping with our
specification. Later, we will see that the results in this theorem are subsumed by Theorem 5.
Theorem 3. SupposeΣ is the theory defined in Definition 6 and TSS is the set of successor
state axioms derived from Tef and Tram of Σ as per (66). Finally assume that Consistency
Assumption 1 holds.
Then ifM is a model of Σfound ∪ TUNA ∪ TSS ∪ T S0ram thenM is a minimal model of Σ
andM captures a solution to the frame and ramification problems under Definition 6.
The models of these theories are not equivalent because the successor state axioms, TSS
only characterize the effects of Poss-ible actions, not all actions. Replacing the ramification
constraints by T S0ram and TSS is insufficient. To be complete, we must somehow express that
the ramification constraints hold for the situations that are not accessible from S0 using
Poss. We can address this issue mathematically, but for most of our applications we are
only interested in considering the subset of the situation tree that is Poss-ible, and so instead
we simply restrict further discussion to this subset of all situations.
7.2. Computing minimal models using circumscription
In this section we observe that semantic entailment in the minimal models of our
prioritized model preference can be captured by circumscription and that, for the class
of theories we are studying, the result of circumscription is first-order definable. We
further show that for our class of theories, the successor state axioms defined in (66)
are equivalent to those generated by computing our circumscription. Indeed, under a
consistency assumption, we show that our circumscription computes the explanation
closure axioms, and in turn the successor state axioms. This result formally establishes
the equivalence between a monotonic theory which includes the successor state axioms
of (66), and our nonmonotonic specification of a solution to the frame and ramification
problems. In what follows we provide a variety of intermediate results that culminate in
the main results, stated in Proposition 3 and Theorem 5.
The objective of our circumscriptive policy is to minimize the difference between the
truth value of fluents in an initial situation and a resultant situation. For any situation
S, our circumscription minimizes abFi (a, S) with Poss(a, S) and Fi(S) fixed and with
Fi(do(a, S)) allowed to vary.
To simplify the computation of this circumscription, we transform our theory Σ into
a simpler theory, Σ∗. The circumscription is then computed with respect to Σ∗ by
exploiting results of Lifschitz on computing circumscription (e.g., [12,13]). Our objective
in transforming our theory is three-fold.
• To make the literal ab explicit in our theory.
• To remove all mention of the situation term s, since our minimization policy and
corresponding circumscription is defined with respect to a fixed situation S.
• To syntactically distinguish between F in F(do(a, s)) and F in F(s) so that we
can exploit results on computing circumscription, and in particular so that we can
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easily compute the predicate completion of fluents, F in our resultant situation, fixing
fluents, F in the initial situation.
The transformation and results are not complex, although the notation may be a little
off-putting. To illustrate the transformation, consider the effect axioms and ramification
constraints for the fluent Wtr_entering_hdr(s), as originally defined in our feedwater
example.
Poss(a, s)∧ a = Disrupt_siphon⊃¬Wtr_entering_hdr(do(a, s)),
Ok(Power, s)∧Ok(Pump, s)∧On(Pump, s)⊃Wtr_entering_hdr(s),
Mnl_filling(s)⊃Wtr_entering_hdr(s).
Our first step is to distinguish the predicate abFi (a, s) into ab+Fi (a, s)∧ ab−Fi (a, s), and to
make them explicit in our theory by adding positive and negative generic frame axioms,
one for each fluent Fi ∈ L. We refer to these frame axioms collectively as Tframe. In our
example, our frame axioms are as follows.
Poss(a, s)∧Wtr_entering_hdr(s)∧¬ab−Wtr_entering_hdr(a, s)
⊃Wtr_entering_hdr(do(a, s)),
Poss(a, s)∧¬Wtr_entering_hdr(s)∧¬ab+Wtr_entering_hdr(a, s)
⊃¬Wtr_entering_hdr(do(a, s)).
Next, we rewrite our theory Σ ∪ Tframe as a new theory, Σ∗. To do so, we extend our
language by the addition of a new predicate Poss∗ and new predicates F ∗i , F ∗∗i , ab
∗+
Fi
,
and ab∗−Fi , one for each fluent Fi ∈ L. Then, for every axiom in Σ ∪ Tframe, we replace
each occurrence of Poss(a, s), F(s), F(do(a, s)), ab+Fi , and ab
−
Fi
with the corresponding
occurrence of Poss∗, F ∗i , F ∗∗i , ab
∗+
Fi
, and ab∗−Fi . In our example above, the axioms are
transformed as follows.
Poss∗(a)∧ a =Disrupt_siphon⊃¬Wtr_entering_hdr∗∗(a),
Ok∗(Power)∧Ok∗(Pump)∧On∗(Pump)⊃Wtr_entering_hdr∗,
Mnl_filling∗ ⊃Wtr_entering_hdr∗,
Ok∗∗(Power, a)∧Ok∗∗(Pump, a)∧On∗∗(Pump, a)⊃Wtr_entering_hdr∗∗(a),
Mnl_filling∗∗(a)⊃Wtr_entering_hdr∗∗(a),
Poss∗(a)∧Wtr_entering_hdr∗ ∧ ¬ab∗−Wtr_entering_hdr(a)⊃ Wtr_entering_hdr∗∗(a),
Poss∗(a)∧¬Wtr_entering_hdr∗ ∧ ¬ab∗+Wtr_entering_hdr(a)
⊃ ¬Wtr_entering_hdr∗∗(a).
Using analogous notation to that employed in Σ , we refer to a = Disrupt_siphon as
γ ∗−Wtr_entering_hdr(a) and
(Ok∗(Power)∧Ok∗(Pump)∧On∗(Pump))∨Mnl_filling∗,
and
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(Ok∗∗(Power, a)∧Ok∗∗(Pump, a)∧On∗∗(Pump, a))∨Mnl_filling∗∗(a)
as υ∗+Wtr_entering_hdr and υ
∗∗+
Wtr_entering_hdr(a) respectively. There is no γ
∗+
Wtr_entering_hdr(a),
no υ∗−Wtr_entering_hdr, and no υ
∗∗−
Wtr_entering_hdr(a).
Generalizing this example,Σ∗ is produced from Σ ∪ Tframe as follows.
Definition 7 (Σ∗). Suppose Σ is the theory defined in Definition 6. Define Σ∗ to be the
theory
Σfound ∪ TUNA ∪ T ∗ef ∪ T ∗ram ∪ T ∗frame, (77)
where Tframe is the set of positive and negative frame axioms, one each for each fluent
Fi ∈Li ,
Poss(a, s)∧ Fi(Ex, s)∧¬ab−Fi (Ex, a, s)⊃ Fi(Ex,do(a, s)), (78)
Poss(a, s)∧¬Fi(Ex, s)∧¬ab+Fi (Ex, a, s)⊃¬Fi(Ex,do(a, s)), (79)
and T ∗frame, T ∗ef and T ∗ram are Tframe above, and Tef , Tram drawn from Σ with
• each occurrence of Fi(Ex, s) replaced by F ∗i (Ex),• each occurrence of Fi(Ex,do(a, s)) replaced by F ∗∗i (Ex, a),
• each occurrence of ab[+/−]Fi (Ex, a, s) replaced by ab
∗[+/−]
Fi
(Ex, a), and
• each occurrence of Poss(a, s) replaced by Poss∗(a).
Correspondingly,
• each occurrence of γ [+/−]Fi (Ex, a, s) is replaced by γ
∗[+/−]
Fi
(Ex, a),
• each occurrence of υ[+/−]Fi (Ex, s) is replaced by υ
∗[+/−]
Fi
(Ex), and
• each occurrence of υ[+/−]Fi (Ex,do(a, s)) is replaced by υ
∗∗[+/−]
Fi
(Ex, a).
Lemma 1 below establishes that our nonmonotonic specification of a solution to the
frame and ramification problems can be captured by prioritized circumscription in our
transformed theory. The results follow directly from the semantic definition of prioritized
circumscription (e.g., [12]), and the definition of our prioritized model preference.
Lemma 1. Suppose Σ is the theory defined in Definition 6 and Σ∗ is the theory defined
in Definition 7. Then M is a minimal model of Σ with respect to the prioritized model
preference of Definition 4 iffM′ is a model of
∀s.CIRC+(Σ∗;Ab1 > · · ·> Abn;F ∗∗1 , . . . ,F ∗∗n ),
where each Abi is a tuple containing the abnormality predicates ab∗+Fi (a) and ab
∗−
Fi
(a),
and where CIRC+ is the circumscription CIRC(Σ∗;Ab1 > · · ·> Abn;F ∗∗1 , . . . ,F ∗∗n ) with
• each occurrence of ab∗[+/−](a) replaced by the corresponding ab[+/−]Fi (a, s),• each occurrence of F ∗i replaced by Fi(s),• each occurrence of F ∗∗i (a) replaced by Fi(do(a, s)), and• each occurrence of Poss∗(a) replaced by Poss(a, s).
Lifschitz proved some very nice results identifying when circumscription is first-order
definable, and when we can actually compute the axioms that result from a circumscription
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(e.g., [12,13]). In the theorem to follow, we exploit these results to show that, under a
consistency assumption, our prioritized circumscription of Abi with respect to Σ∗ leads to
the creation of explanation closure axioms, which when combined with effect axioms and
ramification constraints, are equivalent to successor state axioms.
The consistency assumption upon which we predicate our theorem is the transformation
of Consistency Assumption 1. Recall that the objective of the consistency assumption is to
ensure that Fi(do(a, s)) and ¬Fi(do(a, s)) never co-occur. Since we have added generic
frame axioms to Σ∗, we must reflect this addition in the consistency assumption.
Assumption 2 (Consistency Assumption). For each fluent Fi ∈ Li , assume that:
TUNA ∪ T ∗nec |= Poss∗(a)⊃
¬ [(γ ∗+Fi (a)∨ υ∗∗+Fi (a)∨ (F ∗i ∧¬ab∗−Fi (a)))
∧ (γ ∗−Fi (a)∨ υ∗∗−Fi (a)∨ (¬F ∗i ∧¬ab∗+Fi (a)))
]
. (80)
Theorem 4. SupposeΣ∗ is as defined in Definition 7 and Consistency Assumption 2 holds.
Then
CIRC(Σ∗;Ab1 > · · ·> Abn;F ∗∗1 (a), . . . ,F ∗∗n (a))
≡ Σfound ∪ TUNA ∪ T ∗ef ∪ T ∗ram ∪ T ∗EC ∪ T ∗Ab-equivs
≡ Σfound ∪ TUNA ∪ T ∗SS ∪ T ∗Ab-equivs,
where
• T ∗EC =
⋃n
i=1 T ∗ECi is the set of explanation closure axioms for theory Σ∗.
Each T ∗ECi is a set of formulae of the following form, one each for every Fi ∈Li .
Poss∗(a)∧ F ∗i ∧¬F ∗∗i (a)⊃ γ ∗−Fi (a)∨ υ∗∗−Fi (a),
Poss∗(a)∧¬F ∗i ∧ F ∗∗i (a)⊃ γ ∗+Fi (a)∨ υ∗∗+Fi (a).
• T ∗SS =
⋃n
i=1 T ∗SSi is the set of successor state axioms for theory Σ∗. Each T ∗SSi is a set
of formulae of the following form, one for every Fi ∈ Li .
Poss∗(a)⊃ [F ∗∗i (a)≡ γ ∗+Fi (a)∨Ri−1[υ∗∗+Fi (a)]
∨(F ∗i ∧¬(γ ∗−Fi (a)∨Ri−1[υ∗∗−Fi (a)]))
]
,
where Ri−1 is the regression operator under the successor state axioms, T ∗SS1 ∪ · · · ∪
T ∗SSi−1 .
• T ∗Ab-equivs =
⋃n
i=1 T ∗Ab-equivsi is the set of circumscribed definition of ab
∗+
Fi
(a) and
ab∗−Fi (a). T
∗
Ab-equivsi is a set of formulae of the following form, one formula for every
Fi ∈ Li .
ab∗+Fi (a)≡ Poss∗(a)∧¬F ∗i ∧ (γ ∗+Fi (a)∨ υ∗∗+Fi (a)),
ab∗−Fi (a)≡ Poss∗(a)∧ F ∗i ∧ (γ ∗−Fi (a)∨ υ∗∗−Fi (a)).
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We have shown that our circumscription computes our successor state axioms in our
transformed theory. In what follows we easily relate the results of Theorem 4 back to the
successor state axioms of our original language.
Proposition 3. Suppose Σ is the theory defined in Definition 6 and Σ∗ is the theory
defined in Definition 7 and assume that Consistency Assumption 2 holds. Then
∀s.CIRC+(Σ∗;Ab1 > · · ·> Abn;F ∗∗1 , . . . ,F ∗∗n )
≡ Σfound ∪ TUNA ∪ TSS ∪ TAb-equivs,
where
• CIRC+ is as defined in Lemma 1.
• TSS is the set of successor state axioms for fluents Fi ∈ Li of Σ . They are of the form
of (66).
• TAb-equivs is T ∗Ab-equivs of Theorem 4, with each occurrence of ab∗[+/−](a), F ∗i ,
F ∗∗i (a), and Poss∗(a) replaced by the corresponding ab
[+/−]
Fi
(a, s), Fi(s), Fi(do(a, s)),
and Poss(a, s).
Finally, in the theorem to follow, we show that if we restrict our consideration to the
situations that are Poss-ible in the world, (i.e., s, such that S0 6 s, using notation from
Σfound), then the nonmonotonic theory Σfound ∪ TUNA ∪ Tef ∪ Tram is equivalent to the
monotonic theoryΣfound ∪ TUNA ∪ TSS.
Theorem 5. SupposeΣ is the theory defined in Definition 6 and assume that Consistency
Assumption 1 holds. Further, supposeM is a model of Σ .
Then for variable assignment σs to s such that, S0 6 s, M is a minimal model of
Σ with respect to the prioritized model preference of Definition 4 iff M′ is a model of
Σfound ∪ TUNA ∪ TSS.
Using similar rewriting tricks, we can apply these results to Reiter’s successor state
axiom solution to the frame problem to establish that in the case where there are no
ramification constraints, our prioritized minimization policy, and also Lin and Reiter’s
minimization policy [15] both compute Reiter’s successor state axioms, and hence his
closed-form solution to the frame problem. These results confirm the syntactic form of
Reiter’s successor state axiom solution.
Theorem 6. Suppose Σ is the theory defined in Definition 6 and that Tram = { }. Further,
assume the following consistency condition holds for every Fi ∈Li ,
TUNA |= ¬(γ+Fi (a, s)∧ γ−Fi (a, s)). (81)
SupposeM is a model of Σ . Then for variable assignment σs to s such that, S0 6 s,M
is a minimal model of Σ with respect to the prioritized model preference of Definition 4 iff
M′ is a model of Σfound ∪ TUNA ∪ TSSF , where TSSF is the set of successor state axioms of
the following form.
Poss(a, s)⊃ [Fi(do(a, s))≡ γ+Fi (a, s)∨ (Fi(s)∧¬γ−Fi (a, s))]. (82)
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Condition (81) states that an action cannot make a fluent both true and false in the same
situation. It captures the same intuition as our previous consistency assumption without the
need to discuss ramifications, and consequently, without the need to restrict ourselves to
those situations that are Poss-ible. The successor state axioms, TSSF defined in (82) are the
successor state axioms Reiter identified as his solution to the frame problem [33].
This concludes the independent semantic justification for our closed-form solution.
Proofs of theorems can be found at the publisher’s web site, as noted at the end of this
paper. Detailed proofs and further results can be found in [25].
8. Related work
The dialect of the situation calculus language used in this paper originates with the
Cognitive Robotics Group at the University of Toronto. The intuition behind our solution
to the frame and ramification problems—the notion of interpreting our ramification
constraints as directional or definitional in nature was originally inspired by research on
the semantics of normal logic programs and deductive databases (e.g., [31]), and by the
preliminary work of Pinto [29]. Our compilation approach to solving the ramification
problem, and more specifically our appeal to a completeness assumption to generate
explanation closure axioms was inspired by Reiter’s [33], Schubert’s [39] and Pednault’s
[28] approaches to solving the frame problem.
Our closed-form solution relies on a notion of causal influence, which can either be
expressed by a causal interpretation of the implication connective in the axiomatization,
or by provision of a separate causal influence graph, describing the causal relationships
between fluents. Lin [14] and McCain and Turner [18] were among the first to describe
the relationship between fluents in a ramification constraint as causal. In contrast to our
approach, Lin introduced an explicit Caused predicate into his axiomatization, while
McCain and Turner express ramification constraints as causal laws with a special ⇒
connective.
The basic minimization policy we employed in our semantic justification is derivative
of Lin and Shoham [16] and Lin and Reiter [15], with the important addition of making
the minimization prioritized with respect to the causal influence ordering of fluents. As a
result, we were able to draw a correspondence between our nonmonotonic specification
and circumscription, to show that the corresponding prioritized circumscription was first-
order definable, and that when the circumscription was computed under a consistency
assumption, it produced our closed-form solution. Several other researchers have proposed
nonmonotonic solutions to the frame and ramification problems that are based on
circumscription. For example, Lin [14], Kartha and Lifschitz [9] and Giunchiglia
[7] provide circumscription-based solutions in terms of the situation calculus, while
Gustafsson and Doherty [8] present a solution in the action language PMON. Each of these
characterizations differs in how it axiomatizes the domain, and hence which predicates it
minimizes in its circumscription. A distinguishing feature of our characterization is that
unlike [8,9,14], our circumscription is prioritized and further, it is applied to the whole
theory, not just to some part of the theory. Circumscribing only part of a theory is a
technique referred to by Sandewall as filtered preferential entailment [36]. Shanahan [40]
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provides an extended discussion of the merits of and objections to this technique, which
he refers to as forced separation. That said, the spirit of many of these solutions is similar,
whether it is a predicate called Caused [14], Occluded [8] or Ab (e.g., [9]) that is being
minimized. Indeed the author suspects that for the syntactically restricted case studied here,
all our different proposed solutions may produce equivalent intended interpretations, just
as many of the independent solutions to the frame problem proved to be identical under
certain conditions [1]. A final distinguishing feature of our work is that we prove that our
nonmonotonic solution leads to an articulated closed-form solution, under a consistency
assumption. Causality can be expressed as a separate structure and need not be included
in the original axiomatization of state constraints. Hence, we claim it is more amenable to
addressing the motivating problem we introduced in Section 1.
In addition to circumscription-based solutions to the frame and ramification problem,
Ternovskaia [41] and Denecker et al. [3] independently proposed to characterize effect
axioms and ramification constraints as inductive definitions of fluents. They used these
inductive definitions as an alternative to a circumscription-based definition of solutions
to the frame and ramification problems. Ternovskaia [41] went on to show that both
Reiter’s closed-form solution to the frame problem and our closed-form solution to the
frame and ramification problems could be semantically justified by appealing to this notion
of inductive definitions, providing an alternative to our justification based on prioritized
circumscription.
Finally, several researchers have addressed the ramification problem by exploiting some
form of postprocessing or propagation of indirect effects, that follows computation of
direct effects. Thielscher [42] suggests computing ramifications by an additional post-
processing step over ramification constraints defined as causal laws. This is somewhat akin
to Pinto’s notion of computing ramifications via prime implicate generation [30]. Both
share intuitions with Sandewall’s transition cascade semantics [37].
9. Contributions
This paper addressed the problem of integrating a theory of action with a pre-existing
set of state constraints. The first major contribution of this paper was provision of a
closed-form solution to the frame, ramification and qualification problems for an arguably
common class of theories, which we referred to as solitary stratified theories. The solution
was presented as an automatable procedure that included compilation of effect axioms
and ramification constraints into a set of successor state axioms. The benefit of our
solution over many previous solutions is that the axiomatic closed-form solution enables
us to use monotonic reasoning machinery to perform inference, rather than having to
reason nonmonotonically. Further, the closed-form solution can be viewed as an executable
specification, and is easily realized in Prolog.
The second major contribution of this paper was an independent semantic justification
for our solution. Limiting our attention to solitary stratified theories, we proposed a
semantic specification for a solution to the frame and ramification problems in terms of
a prioritized minimization policy, proving that the successor state axioms of our closed-
form solution agreed with this specification. Establishing our minimization policy as an
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instance of prioritized circumscription over the causal influence ordering of fluents, we
observed that this circumscription was first-order definable and showed that computing the
prioritized circumscription produced our successor state axioms. We also showed that in
the special case where there are no ramification constraints, computing the circumscription
produced exactly Reiter’s earlier successor state axiom solution to the frame problem. Not
only did these results provide semantic justification for our closed-form solution to the
frame and ramification problem, and as a side effect, Reiter’s closed-form solution to the
frame problem, but they also provided a nonmonotonic characterization of the solution,
which relates this work to other research on this subject.
In closing, the research presented in this paper was originally motivated by the specific
problem of integrating a representation of action with the representation of the behaviour
of physical systems, for the purpose of diagnostic problem solving. McIlraith [24–26]
provides an account of this specific problem and the use of our solution in various
diagnostic problem solving tasks.
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